FOUCAULT, GOVERNMENTALITY, AND CRITIQUE

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A Genealogy of the Modern State

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> Our mistake is not that we believe in the State, whereas only states exist: our mistake is that we believe in the State or in states, and we fail to study the practices that project the objectivizations we mistake for the State or its varieties. (Veyne 1997: 162)

In his lectures of 1978 and 1979 at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault responded to some (Marxist) critics who had complained that the "genealogy of power" lacked an elaborated theory of the state. Foucault remarked that he had refrained from pursuing a theory of the state "as one can and must forgo an indigestible meal" (2008: 76–77). However, a few sentences later Foucault states: "The problem of bringing under state control, of 'statification' (*étatisation*) is at the heart of the questions I have tried to address" (ibid.: 77).

This chapter explores this apparent contradiction and investigates the contribution of an "analytics of government" to state theory. This approach takes up methodological and theoretical considerations that Foucault developed in his "genealogy of the modern state" (2007: 354). It is marked by three analytical dimensions. First, it presents a nominalist account that stresses the central importance of knowledge and political discourses in the constitution of the

state. Secondly, an analytics of government uses a broad concept of technology that encompasses not only material but also symbolic devices, including political technologies as well as technologies of the self. Third, it conceives of the state as an instrument and effect of political strategies that define the external borders between the public and the private and the state and civil society, and also determine the internal structure of political institutions and state apparatuses. After presenting the three analytical dimensions, the last part of the chapter will compare this theoretical perspective with the concept of governance.

The Historical Ontology of the State

The point of departure of an analytics of government is "the 'governmentalization' of the state" (Foucault 2007: 109). According to Foucault, government by state agencies must be conceived of as a contingent political process and a singular historical event in need of explanation rather than a given fact. A series of "how" questions follow from this problematization. How does the state come to act, if at all, as a coherent political force? How is the imaginary unity of the state produced in practical terms? How does a plurality of institutions and processes become "the state"? How to account for the apparent autonomy of the state as a separate entity that somehow stands outside and above society?

   To pursue these questions, Foucault proposes an analytical framework he sometimes calls "a political history of truth" or "historical nominalism" (e.g., 1997c: 200; 2000g: 238; 2008: 318). This methodological-theoretical perspective informs not only his "genealogy of the modern state" in the 1978–1979 lectures at the Collège de France, but also his book on the *Birth of the Prison* and the first volume of the *History of Sexuality* (Foucault 1977; 1980b).[1] Foucault's historical nominalism is a critical investigation consisting of a positive and a negative component. The latter is closely tied to subverting self-evidences and universal truth claims: "It means making visible a *singularity* at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all. To show that things 'weren't as necessary as all that'" (2000g: 226; emphasis in original). The second "theoretico-political function" of historical

nominalism consists of "rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on, that at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal, and necessary" (ibid.: 226–227).[2]

This dual movement characterizes the specific profile of Foucault's nominalism. The objective of this approach is not to dispute that there is some "object" to which "state" refers; rather, the point called into question is whether this referent is identical to the "state" itself. In fact, the idea of a universal and neutral state can itself be comprehended as a specific "state effect." The concept of government is meant to historically situate statehood, to reflect on its conditions of existence and rules of transformation. An analytics of government studies the practical conditions under which forms of statehood emerge, stabilize, and change—combining and connecting diverse "elements" in such a way that retrospectively an "object" appears that seemed to have existed prior to the historical and political process, presumably guiding and directing it. As Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller put it:

> [T]he state can be seen as a specific way in which the problem of government is discursively codified, a way of dividing a "political sphere," with its particular characteristics of rule, from other, "non-political spheres" to which it must be related, and a way in which certain technologies of government are given a temporary institutional durability and brought into particular kinds of relations with one another. (Rose and Miller 1992: 176–177; Lascoumes 2004)

According to Foucault, the state possesses the same epistemological status as politics and the economy. These entities are "things that do not exist and yet which are inscribed in reality and fall under a regime of truth dividing the true and the false" (Foucault 2008: 20). The state is not an object that is always already there, nor can it be reduced to an illusionary or ideological effect of hegemonic practices. Rather, the state is conceptualized as a "transactional reality [*réalité de transaction*]" (ibid.: 297), that is to say, a dynamic ensemble of relations and syntheses that at the same time produces the institutional structure of the state and the knowledge of the state. An analytics of government investigates the "historical ontology" (Foucault 1997h: 315) of the state, searching for discontinuities and ruptures in the regimes of truth. The assumption that

the state does not exist is followed by the question of how different elements and practices made it possible that something like *the* state possesses a historical reality and structural consistency over a longer period of time.[3]

It follows that an analytics of government takes seriously the historical and systematic importance of "political knowledge" (Foucault 2007: 363) for state analysis. Historically, the emergence and stability of state agencies is intimately tied to the incessant generation, circulation, storage, and repression of knowledge. The constitution of the modern state was closely connected with the rise of the human sciences and the production of knowledge about the population and individuals. It also depended on information concerning the physical condition of the national territory, diplomatic and secret knowledge about the strengths and weaknesses of foreign states, and other forms of knowledge that rendered objects calculable and programmable. State actors and agencies used statistical accounts, medical expertise, scientific reports, architectural plans, bureaucratic rules and guidelines, surveys, graphs, and so on to represent events and entities as information and data for political action. These "inscription devices" (Latour 1986) made it possible to define problems, specify areas of intervention, calculate resources, and determine political goals (Burke 2000; Vismann 2000; Desrosières 2002; Collin and Horstmann 2004).

In systematic terms, political knowledge plays a dual role in the constitution of the modern state. On the one hand, political rationalities provide cognitive and normative maps that open up spaces of government that are intrinsically linked to truth. State agencies produce and proliferate forms of knowledge that enable them to act upon the governed reality. On the other hand, the state is constituted by discourses, narratives, worldviews and styles of thought that allow political actors to develop strategies and realize goals. What is more, these symbolic devices even define what it means to be an actor, who may qualify as a political subject and citizen (Nullmeier 1993; Meyer 1999; Steinmetz 1999b; Müller, Raufer and Zifonun 2002; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). Finally, it would be a misunderstanding to reduce political knowledge to scientific reasoning and rational argumentation since it is also embodied in routine action, cultural beliefs, and normative orientations. Thus the state is not only a material structure and a mode of thinking,

but also a lived and embodied experience, a mode of existence (see Maihofer 1995; Sauer 2001: 110–112).

This analytical perspective has two important theoretical merits. First, the commonplace contrast between state formation and policymaking loses credibility, since the former is not a single event but an enduring process in which the limits and contents of state action are permanently negotiated and redefined. It follows "that 'policies' that affect the very structure of the state are part of the ongoing process of state-formation" (Steinmetz 1999a: 9; Gottweis 2003). Second, this approach makes it possible to include the observer's position in the process of theory construction. Political and sociological knowledge, operating with dualisms like individual and state, knowledge and power, and so on, plays a constitutive role in the emergence and reproduction of concrete forms of statehood. It provides a symbolic infrastructure that maps possible sites of intervention, and it is also inside this cultural framework that subjects define and live their relation to the state (Demirović 1998: 49–50; Mitchell 1991: 94; Rose and Miller 1992: 182).

Technologies of Government: The Materiality of the State

As the focus on "how" questions indicates, an analytics of government examines governmental technologies as a way of accounting for political transformations and state policies. It proposes a concept of technology that seeks to grasp the materiality of technologies by circumventing two possible pitfalls that either reduce technologies to an expression of social relations or conceive of society as the result of technological determinations.[4] To counter expressivist and determinist accounts, an analytics of government extends the notion of technology in two ways.

First, an analytics of government examines how forms of subjectivity, gender regimes, and lifestyles are produced in practical terms by distinguishing a plurality of governmental technologies. Foucault addressed four different forms of technology in his work. In *Discipline and Punish* (1977) and in *The History of Sexuality, Vol. I* (1980b), he analyzed technologies seeking to discipline the individual body or to regulate population processes. In his later work he was also sensitive to the workings of "technologies of the self" and "political technologies of individuals." While the former

concentrate on processes of self-guidance and the ways in which subjects relate to themselves as ethical beings, the latter denote "the way by which … we have been led to recognize ourselves as a society, as a part of a social entity, as a part of a nation or a state" (Foucault 2000f: 404).[5] By focusing on diverse and distinct technologies, an analytics of government avoids the pre-analytical distinction between micro- and macro-level, individual and state. It conceives of both processes of individualization and practices of institutionalization as technologies of government. This approach makes it possible to address the relationships between different governmental technologies. For example, one can investigate how technologies of the self and political government are articulated with each other (see Foucault 1988; 1993: 203–204).

Second, an analytics of government operates with a concept of technology that includes not only material but also symbolic devices.[6] It follows that discourses, narratives, and regimes of representation are not reduced to pure semiotic propositions; instead, they are regarded as performative practices. Governmental technologies denote a complex of practical mechanisms, procedures, instruments, and calculations through which authorities seek to guide and shape the conduct and decisions of individuals and collectives in order to achieve specific objectives. These technologies include: "methods of examination and evaluation; techniques of notation, numeration, and calculation; accounting procedures; routines for the timing and spacing of activities in specific locations; presentational forms such as tables and graphs; formulas for the organization of work; standardized tactics for the training and implantation of habits; pedagogic, therapeutic, and punitive techniques of reformulation and cure; architectural forms in which interventions take place (i.e., classrooms and prisons); and professional vocabularies" (Inda 2005: 9; see also Miller and Rose 2008: 32–35; Rose and Miller 1992: 183).

Let us once again note two theoretical implications of this perspective. On the one hand, the distinction between soft and hard, material and symbolic technologies, between political technologies and technologies of the self, becomes precarious. An analytics of government proposes an integral account that investigates the dynamic interplay of elements that are often systematically separated. On the other hand, this theoretical perspective questions the notion

of a state apparatus confined to the structural and organizational characteristics of the state as an institutional ensemble. An analytics of government reverses this "institutionalcentric" (Foucault 2007: 116) account by conceiving of institutions as technologies. Instead of taking institutions as the point of departure, it focuses on technologies that are materialized and stabilized in institutional settings. Rather than attributing political transformations to the policies of an autonomous state, an analytics of government traces them in new technologies and forms of knowledge that provide the "very possibility of appearing to set apart from society the free-standing apparatus of a state" (Mitchell 1991: 92).[7]

Strategies and State Effects

An analytics of government conceives of the state as an effect and instrument of political strategies and relations of power. The state is an *effect* of strategies since it cannot be reduced to a homogeneous, stable actor that exists prior to political action. Rather, *the* state is to be understood as an emergent and complex resultant of conflicting and contradictory governmental practices. Bob Jessop's idea of a plurality of state projects fruitfully illustrates this point. Jessop rightly reminds us that "whether, how and to what extent one can talk in definite terms about the state actually depends on the contingent and provisional outcome of struggles to realize more or less specific 'state projects'" (Jessop 1990: 9; 1996). Like state projects, "arts of government" are not the objects of political theories or abstract ideologies, but an integral part of a regime of practices that specifies the objectives of governmental action and is regulated by continuous reflection (see Foucault 2008: 2). But grounding the state in a network of governmental practices does not mean that the state is a secondary category that could be dispensed with. On the contrary, it occupies a strategic position:

"It is certain that, in contemporary societies, the state is not simply one of the forms of specific situations of the exercise of power—even if it is the most important—but that, in a certain way, all other forms of power relation must refer to it. But this is not because they are derived from it; rather, it is because power relations have become more and more under state control.... Using here the restricted meaning of the word 'government', one could

say that power relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions." (Foucault 2000k: 345)

This strategic approach goes well beyond a juridical conception of the state. Neither is the state the result of a social contract nor can it be understood as a compromise between classes, genders, or other group identities. "Compromise" or "contract" are the result rather than the origin of strategic articulation. These categories are in need of explanation rather than given facts (see ibid.: 340–348). Instead of understanding the state in juridical categories, we have to conceive of it within the logic of strategic relations that constitute a collective will that did not exist beforehand. While ideas of contract and compromise are insufficient to understand the transformations and dynamics of state action, the concept of translation in actor-network theory might prove more helpful. In their critique of the Hobbesian model of the social contract and the concept of political sovereignty, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour propose "a sociology of translation." In their view the contract is merely a specific instance of the general phenomenon of translation. By translation they understand "all the negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion and violence, thanks to which an actor or force takes, or causes to be conferred on itself, authority to speak or act on behalf of another actor or force" (Callon and Latour 1981: 279). From this perspective, translation does not mean the correct transmission of an already existing text or will into another, but something quite different: translation produces this text or will by expressing in one's own language what others say and want, why they act in the way they do (Callon 1986: 223–224).

However, the state is not only an effect but also an instrument and a site of strategic action. It serves as an *instrument* of strategies insofar as it establishes a frontier regime that is defined by the distinction between inside and outside, state and non-state. This borderline does not simply separate two external and independent realms, but operates as an internal division. It constitutes a differential frontier regime that establishes and reproduces structural gaps between private and public, residents and foreigners, and so on (Mitchell 1991: 89–91; see Valverde 1996: 367–369). As a result,

the fact that some actors and processes are regarded as private may secure them a privileged role or, alternatively, may deprive them of financial and organizational resources and legal protection—a "bareness" that may in turn be exploited in economic or ideological terms (see Agamben 1998). Examples of this include the situation of illegal immigrants in Western societies and male violence in the family. Concerning the latter, feminist state theory has observed that modern statehood was marked by a "dual face" (Sauer 2004: 117): monopolization and centralization of the legitimate means of violence in the hands of the state corresponded to the father's right to employ physical violence in relations with other family members.

Finally, the state is also a *site* of strategic action. The inner structure of the state is characterized by a materiality that Bob Jessop, drawing on Nicos Poulantzas's account of the state as a social relation (1977), has defined as "strategic selectivity." The term refers to the state's differential impact on the capacity of different political forces to pursue their strategies and to realize their goals (Jessop 1990: 9–10). It addresses the relational character of this selectivity and focuses on the constraints imposed by existing institutional structures. As Jessop puts it: "Particular forms of state privilege some strategies over others, privilege the access of some forces over others, some interests over others, some time horizons over others, some coalition possibilities over others. A given type of state, a given state form, a given form of regime, will be more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategies they adopt to gain state power" (ibid.: 10). A certain type of state is more suited to the pursuit of some economic and political strategies than others, because of the modes of intervention and resources characterizing the structure of the state. However, this structure does not determine the success or failure of political strategies. The differential impact is not inscribed in the state apparatus as such, but is the result of the dynamic and mobile interactions between state structures and the strategies adopted by different forces toward it (ibid.: 260–262).[8]

Let me again emphasize two important consequences of this "logic of strategy" (Foucault 2008: 42). First, if we take seriously the strategic dimension of statehood, a range of problems and questions will be opened up for state theory that have mostly been

regarded as "private," reflecting a failure to recognize that the private domain does not signify a protected and separated space outside state interventions, but is itself the object of the state's power of definition and regulation. An analytics of government asks what forms of identity are accepted, proliferated, or on the contrary hindered or even suppressed by the state. What gender regime is coupled to concrete forms of statehood? What apparatus of sexuality, what forms of family and reproduction are promoted, marginalized, or even repressed?

Second, an analytics of government goes well beyond the limits of both positivist accounts of the state and theories that dispense with the category of the state altogether. It proposes an approach to the state that does not take for granted the idea of some originating subject that pre-exists and determines political processes and is referred to as *the* state; nor does it simply denounce the statist account as an ideology or myth that doesn't correspond to the complexity of political and social reality. While it is necessary to refuse to accept the apparent autonomy of the state and the state-society distinction, an analytics of government goes one step further. It not only criticizes "idealist" accounts of the state, but also seeks to explain how the "myth" of an autonomous state is produced and reproduced in social relations at the same time as it remains an integral and organizing part of it.

Governmentality and Governance

An analytics of government enables us to overcome some theoretical blind spots of the governance discourse that dominates contemporary accounts of state transformations and policies. The term *governance* was introduced into political science and organizational theory as an academic term in the 1980s. Since then it has enjoyed an impressive career, and is used today as a "catch-all term" (Smouts 1998: 81) or a "buzzword" (Jessop 1998: 29) to refer to any mode of coordination of interdependent activities.[9] In a very general sense the word signifies any strategy, process, procedure, or program for controlling, regulating, or managing problems on a global, national, local, or organizational level. The academic literature ranges from governance in public administration and public policy, international relations, and European governance to

corporate governance (Kooiman 1993; Marks et al. 1996; Prakash and Hart 1999; Willke 2007). Governance involves a shift in the analytical and theoretical focus from "institutions" to "processes" of rule, and announces the eclipse or erosion of state sovereignty. It accounts for the growing interdependencies between political authorities and social and economic actors, capturing the policy networks and public-private partnerships that emerge out of the interactions between a variety of bureaucracies, organizations, and associations. Governance encompasses on the one hand the displacement to supranational levels of practices that were formerly defined in terms of the nation-state (e.g., the European Union or the United Nations); on the other hand, the governance literature stresses that there are important mechanisms of social regulation besides the state—such as the community, organizations, and the market (Rose 1999: 15-17; Benz 2004).

There are several themes and topics the governance discourse shares with an analytics of government. First, a common feature of both approaches is an interest in "how" questions and a focus on governmental practices, which distinguishes them both from political studies that concentrate on attitudes, mentalities, and opinions in order to understand politics. Second, governance and governmentality extend the scope of political analysis beyond the domain of the state and institutional politics. They both investigate "political power beyond the state" (Rose and Miller 1992), that is to say the forms of power that configure apparently non-political sites like the school, the prison, or the family. Third, the two theoretical accounts are characterized by a relational understanding of power. Power is not conceived as a stable and fixed entity that could be "stored" at particular institutional sites, but signifies the result of a mobile and flexible interactional and associational network (Walters 2004: 31–33).

Yet in spite of these similarities, there remain important differences concerning fundamental assumptions and theoretical orientations between the governance discourse and an analytics of government. The first difference relates to the ontological status of the objects of governance. As Bob Jessop remarks, "much of the literature on governance assumes that the objects of governance pre-exist their coordination in and through specific governance mechanisms" (2003: 6). This realist approach to politics contrasts

with the nominalism of an analytics of government. The latter does not start from the assumption that there is an external relationship between government and its objects; quite on the contrary, it recognizes that government is also actively involved in constituting agents, identities, and interests.

This brings us to a second difference that relates to the role of politics in the governance literature. The governance discourse stresses dialogue, participation, and the representation of "the governed." It seeks to give visibility to interests that are often ignored, and extends the public sphere insofar as it promotes the consultation and inclusion of a whole range of societal and economic actors who are addressed as "partners" or "stakeholders." However, serious doubts could be raised concerning the prospect of an increasing democratization. The governance literature assumes that political decisions are based on neutral facts or rational arguments, thereby ignoring the role of strategic options and political alternatives. As a consequence, it often marginalizes fundamental conflicts between different social groups and classes or downplays contradictions between political interests and objectives—and is rightly criticized for "failing to take note of important aspects in the analysis of political processes that pertain to a sociology of domination" (Mayntz 2004: 74; Smouts 1998). For example, most of the literature on global governance takes it for granted that the political and social cleavages between those who profit from globalization and those who do not can be bridged by "modern" or "good" governance. In this view, poverty and wealth have nothing to do with each other, and economic growth, ecological considerations, political democracy, social solidarity, healthy living, and so on appear to be equally achievable—without radically changing established political and social structures (Brunnengräber and Stock 1999; Rucht 2001; Brand 2004). While an analytics of government endorses a strategic account stressing the constitutive role of political conflicts and confrontations, the governance discourse seeks to minimize "frictions" and is characterized by an "antipolitical politics" (Walters 2004: 33–37; Hirst 2000; Mouffe 2005).

It follows that the governance discourse promotes a technocratic model of steering and managing—this feature marks the third point where the governance discourse departs from an analytics of government. Most of the governance literature relies heavily on a specific

meta-narrative. It claims to be a political response to the growing social complexity that calls for multilevel, networked, cooperative, heterarchic alternatives to hierarchic and state-centered forms of regulation (Jessop 1998).[10] However, this account represents a rather distorted image of the past and ignores the multiple ways in which even the most interventionist welfare states are governed by "indirect" mechanisms and forms of cooperation and implication: "Governance theory works with a somewhat exaggerated conception of the power of the postwar welfare state. This has the effect, in turn, of overemphasizing the novelty and significance of many of the phenomena of 'steering', 'regulation', and indirect control typically grouped under the rubric of 'new' governance" (Walters 2004: 38). The caricature of a time when states were "whole" (and not yet "fragmented" and "decentered") serves as background for the claim of a decisive historical break. The diagnosis of a growing complexity of the social world—the globalization of financial and other markets, the importance of information and communication technologies, the emergence of new forms of production and so on—is linked to the idea of the "end of politics," to a "postideological" world order that is no longer governed by profound conflicts and oppositions. In this view, governance is about steering and regulating a world without radical alternatives and is animated by the search for "rational," "responsible," and "efficient" instruments of problem management. On this reading, strategic interests are reduced to technological concerns; politics just seems to follow the dictate of a logic of complexity. In contrast to this technocratic and managerialist approach, an analytics of government is more reflexive concerning the function of political knowledge and the intimate link between politics and technology. It does not take the "complexity" narrative at face value but investigates the role it plays in constituting and legitimizing governance as a particular style of rule (ibid.: 40–41).

Seen from the perspective of an analytics of government, the governance discourse represents a particular "art of government" that is firmly rooted within a liberal concept of the state. It stresses political consensus, mutual accommodation, and collective problem solving, and searches for mechanisms that foster coordination, cooperation, and harmonization. The governance discourse translates fundamental political antagonisms and oppositions into

procedural arrangements to articulate different but reconcilable interests. It conceives of strategic confrontations as diverse "inputs" to reach a decision or to carry out a program. In this conceptual frame, conflicts are not regarded as a threat to social order, but as a means of social progress: "Governance … marks the space of a liberal game of assimilation. Where many political discourses seek to articulate a field of antagonistic forces as agents of political transformation, governance seeks to implicate them as 'partners' in a game of collective self-management and modulated social adjustment" (ibid.: 35).

Furthermore, a large part of the governance discourse seems still to accept the duality of state and society. Often governance is explicitly defined by a distance from the state, focusing on informal arrangements and decision-making processes below state institutions and beyond the competence of political authorities ("government"). Its proponents distinguish strictly between hierarchical interventions by the state and decentralized societal mechanisms, exploring the interdependencies and networks between the two domains. By contrast, an analytics of government takes the state to be an integral part of governmental practices; it is an instrument and effect of these practices, not their foundation or counterpart. It follows that the opposition of state and civil society cannot be taken as a universal fact, but constitutes a contingent and internal element of governmental practices. On this reading, the governance discourse illustrates what Foucault once described as an "overvaluation of the problem of the state" (2007: 109)—the paradoxical result of reducing the state to an institutional ensemble and a hierarchical structure. As Wendy Larner and William Walters put it: "[G]overnmentality can offer a particular kind of historical perspective that is often lacking in the global governance literature. This would involve seeing global governance as a particular technology of rule and placing it within the much longer trajectory of liberal political reason" (2004c: 16–17; see also Crowley 2003).

But an analytics of government not only offers a critical account of the governance discourse, it also exposes some shortcomings of approaches that suffer from an inverse fixation. While the governance literature often caricatures the state as a hierarchical and bureaucratic apparatus, the anti-globalization literature and many critical accounts of neo-liberal modes of government tend to invoke

a nostalgic image of the nation-state as an actor defending public interests against powerful economic actors (see, e.g., Bourdieu 1998). The problem with this kind of analysis is that it also essentializes the state, being preoccupied with a territorial nation-state that is supposedly being eroded by global economic regimes (see chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion). Taken together, the two opposing forms of analysis result in an interesting theoretical-political constellation. While some scholars demand a "reinvention of government" (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) that includes a comprehensive deregulation and privatization of state functions and the downsizing of the political apparatus in the light of new global economic challenges, others call for the state to resist "the economic horror" (Forrester 1999) in order to protect citizens from the negative aspects of globalization. Neither of these approaches recognizes the necessity of a relational, technological, and strategic approach that takes into account the fact that the state *and* the economy are themselves being reconfigured and reinvented in novel ways. Both consider the nation-state as a prefabricated and stable form, failing to see that the relations between state and economy, global and local, as well as the categories themselves, require theoretical attention (Perry and Maurer 2003a).

An Indigestible Meal?

This chapter started with Foucault's remark that he had refrained from pursuing a theory of the state "in the sense that one abstains from an indigestible meal." At the same time Foucault claims to provide nothing less than a "genealogy of the modern state." I have examined this apparent contradiction in order to determine what an analytics of government might offer to state theory.

Foucault's analytics of government combines the "microphysics of power" (Foucault 1977: 28), which remained centered on questions of discipline and normalization, with the "level of macro-power" (2008: 358). This approach investigates how power relations have historically been concentrated in the form of the state without ever being reducible to it. Following this line of inquiry, Foucault sees the state as "nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities. That is why I propose … moving outside and questioning the problem of the state, undertaking an

investigation of the problem of the state, on the basis of practices of governmentality" (ibid.: 77–78). When Foucault focuses on the "governmentalization of the state" (2007: 109), he does not assume that government is a technique that could be applied or used by state authorities or apparatuses; instead, he comprehends the state itself as a dynamic and contingent form of societal power relations.[11]

As I have argued, an analytics of government is characterized by a triple movement of pluralization and decentralization that Foucault sums up as follows:

"In short, the point of view … involved the attempt to free relations of power from the institution, in order to analyze them from the point of view of technologies; to distinguish them also from the function, so as to take them up within a strategic analysis; and to detach them from the privilege of the object, so as to resituate them within the perspective of the constitution of fields, domains, and objects of knowledge" (ibid.: 118).

Practices instead of object, strategies instead of function, and technologies instead of institution—this is certainly not a light snack, but it might be the recipe for a state theory that opens up new directions and research areas for political analysis and critique and provides a better understanding of current political and social transformations.

3

Liberalism, Biopolitics, and Technologies of Security

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Foucault's work on governmentality not only offers important insights for an analysis of the state, it also provides us with analytical tools to investigate the relationship between liberal freedom and "technologies of security." In this chapter, I would like to stress some important aspects of the dynamic interplay between freedom, security, and fear that Foucault sees as constitutive for liberalism. I will first outline how Foucault introduces the notion of "technologies of security" in his analysis of liberalism and biopolitics. The next part investigates the role fear plays in liberal government. Foucault demonstrates that liberalism is characterized by a "culture of danger" that permanently threatens the freedom it produces. The third section develops further the notion of technologies of security as an analytical tool to account for current social and political transformations, and the final section will briefly indicate a different idea of autonomy and security.

Liberalism and the Birth of Biopolitics

The notion of "technologies of security" does not originate in Foucault's lectures on governmentality, but was already present in his

earlier work. Foucault uses it when he introduces the concept of biopolitics in his lectures at the Collège de France of 1976 (2003) and in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* (1980b).[1] In these texts Foucault identifies a new form of power that is different from sovereign power. This "biopower" consists of two basic modes: the disciplining of the individual body and the regulatory control of the population (1980b: 139). Foucault calls the latter a "technology of security" (2003: 249). It aims at the mass phenomena characteristic of a population and its conditions of variation, seeking to prevent or compensate for dangers that result from its existence as a biological entity.[2]

Two years later, in his lectures at the Collège de France in 1978 and 1979, Foucault takes up again the notion of "technologies of security." Here, though, he discusses the topic of biopolitics in a different theoretical framework that goes beyond his initial interest in processes of disciplination and the regulation of bodies. Biopolitics now also refers to processes of subjectivation and state formation. *The Birth of Biopolitics* (the title of the 1979 lecture series) is closely linked to the emergence of liberal forms of government. Foucault conceives of liberalism not as an economic theory or a political ideology but as a specific art of governing human beings. It has its target in the epistemic figure of population, and it relies on political economy as the principal form of knowledge. Liberalism introduces a rationality of government that differs both from medieval concepts of domination and from early modern state reason: the idea of a nature of society that constitutes the basis and the border of governmental practice. This concept of nature is not a traditional idea or something left over from premodern times; rather, it marks an important historical rupture in the history of political thought. In the Middle Ages good government is understood as part of the natural order created by God's will. State reason breaks with this idea of nature, which limited political action and embedded it in a cosmological continuum. Instead, state reason proposes the artificiality of a "leviathan"—which provokes the charge of atheism. With the physiocrats and political economy, nature reappears as a point of reference for political action. However, this is a different nature that has nothing to do with a divine order of creation or cosmological principles. At the center of liberal reflection is a hitherto unknown nature, the historical result of radically transformed relations of

living and producing: the "second nature" of the developing civil society (see Foucault 2007).

Political economy, which emerged as a distinctive form of knowledge in the eighteenth century, replaced the moralistic and rigid principles of mercantilist and cameralist economic regulation with the idea of spontaneous self-regulation of the market on the basis of "natural" prices. Authors like Adam Smith, David Hume, and Adam Ferguson assume that there exists a nature that is peculiar to governmental practices, and that governments have to respect this nature in their operations. Thus, governmental practices should be in line with the laws of a nature that they themselves have constituted. For this reason, the principle of government shifts from external congruence to internal regulation. The coordinates of governmental action are no longer legitimacy or illegitimacy, but success or failure; reflection focuses not on the abuse or arrogance of power but rather on ignorance concerning its use.

Political economy introduces into the art of government for the first time the question of truth and the principle of self-limitation. As a consequence, it is no longer important to know whether the sovereign governs according to divine, natural, or moral laws; rather, it is necessary to investigate the "natural order of things" that defines both the foundations and the limits of governmental action. The new art of government, which became apparent in the middle of the eighteenth century, no longer seeks to maximize the powers of the state. Instead, it mobilizes "economic" reasoning to assess whether governmental action is necessary and useful or superfluous or even harmful. But this historical transformation is by no means accompanied by a reduction of state power. Paradoxically, the liberal recourse to nature makes it possible to leave nature behind, or more precisely to leave behind a certain concept of nature that conceives of it as eternal, holy, or unchangeable. For liberals, nature is not an autonomous domain in which intervention is forbidden as a matter of principle or impossible. Nature is not a material substratum to which governmental practices are applied, but rather their permanent correlate. It is true that there is a "natural" limit to state intervention, as it has to take into account the nature of the social facts. However, this regulatory principle does not point to a negative borderline, since it is precisely the "nature" of the population that opens up a series of hitherto unknown possibilities of intervention.

These do not necessarily take the form of direct interdictions or regulations: "laissez-faire," inciting, and stimulating become more important than dominating, prescribing, and decreeing (Foucault 2007: 70–76; 2008: 267–316).

The formation of political economy and the new political figure of population cannot be separated from the emergence of modern biology. Liberal concepts of autonomy and freedom are closely connected to biological notions of self-regulation and self-preservation, which prevailed over the hitherto dominant mechanistic paradigm of investigating bodies. Biology, which emerged in about 1800 as the science of life, assumes a basic principle of development that accounts for the contingency of life without any foundational or fixed program. The idea of an external order that corresponds to the plans of a higher instance beyond life is displaced by the concept of an inner organization characterized by life as a dynamic and abstract principle common to all organisms. From now on living bodies are more clearly distinguished from artifacts, and are characterized in terms of categories like self-preservation, reproduction, and development (cf. Foucault 1970).

In the 1978 and 1979 lectures, Foucault conceives of "liberalism as the general framework of biopolitics" (2008: 22). This account of liberalism signals a shift of emphasis in relation to his previous work. The theoretical displacement results from the self-critical insight that his earlier analysis of biopolitics was one-dimensional and reductive, in the sense that it primarily focused on the biological and physical life of a population and on the politics of the body. Introducing the notion of government helps to broaden the theoretical horizon, as it links the interest in a "political anatomy of the human body" with the investigation of subjectivation processes and moral forms of existence. From this perspective, biopolitics represents a distinctive and dynamic constellation that characterizes liberal government. With liberalism, but not before, the question arises of how subjects are to be governed if they are both legal persons and living beings (see Foucault 2008: 317).[3]

This is the relationship Foucault has in mind when he insists that it is impossible to separate biopolitical problems "from the framework of political rationality within which they appeared and took on their intensity. This means 'liberalism,' since it was in relation to liberalism that they assumed the form of a challenge. How can the

phenomena of 'population,' with its specific effects and problems, be taken into account in a system concerned about respect for legal subjects and individual free enterprise? In the name of what and according to what rules can it be managed?" (2008: 317).

Technologies of Security

In this context, the question of security becomes acute. Foucault regards the establishment of "technologies," "apparatuses," or "mechanisms of security" (2007: 59, 108, 7) as a distinctive feature of liberal forms of government. In the following, I would like to stress some important aspects of the relationship between freedom, security, and fear that Foucault sees as constitutive for liberalism.

To start with, we have to note that Foucault does not ground his analysis in the assumption that liberalism (in contrast to earlier forms of government) seeks to enhance the freedom of individuals or to expand their rights. According to Foucault, freedom is neither an anthropological constant nor a historical universal that is confined or respected by different societies. Freedom cannot be measured in quantitative terms, but denotes a social relation: "Freedom is never anything other … than an actual relation between governors and governed" (2008: 63; Lemke 2001b).

Foucault sees the distinctiveness of liberal forms of government in the fact that they replace an external regulation by an internal production. Liberalism is not limited to providing a simple guarantee of liberties (freedom of the market, of private property, of speech, and so on) that exist independently of governmental practice. Quite on the contrary: liberalism organizes the conditions under which individuals could and should exercise these liberties. In this sense, freedom is not the counterpart of liberal government but its necessary basis; it is not a natural resource but an artificially arranged product and instrument of governmental practices. In short: liberal freedom is not the (negative) right of individuals to confront power, but the positive effect of governmental action. Liberal government does not expand the spaces of freedom, it is not limited to respect for this or that freedom—it "consumes freedom" (2008: 63; Bonnafous-Boucher 2001).

But at this point things get complicated. In the very same process of the production of freedom, liberalism also endangers

the freedom it constitutes. It is precisely the "free play of forces" inside liberal forms of government that threatens these liberties and necessitates new interventions to "protect" or "stabilize" them. Foucault illustrates this "paradox" (2008: 64) with the example of the freedom of trade. Freedom of trade can only be established if a whole series of preventive measures are taken, which aim to avoid and counter tendencies of monopolization and centralization that would result in a limitation of freedom of trade: "There must be free trade ... but how can we practice free trade in fact if we do not control and limit a number of things, and if we do not organize a series of preventive measures to avoid the effects of one country's hegemony over others, which would be precisely the limitation and restriction of free trade?" (2008: 64).

At the heart of liberalism there is a problematic and paradoxical relationship between the incessant production of freedom and the permanent danger of its destruction. Liberal freedom presupposes the establishment of limitations, controls, and forms of constraint. The problem of liberal government is to ensure that pursuit of individual or collective interests does not endanger the general interest. It follows that liberal freedom cannot be exercised in an unlimited way, but has to be regulated by a principle of calculation: apparatuses of security are the other side and the condition of existence of liberal government. The extension of control procedures and the deepening of mechanisms of constraint are the counterweight to the emergence of new liberties (see Opitz 2008).

But the liberal relationship between freedom and security is even more complex. Liberalism does not only produce freedoms, which are permanently endangered (by their own conditions of production) and require mechanisms of security. Danger and insecurity (the threat of unemployment, poverty, social degradation, etc.) are not only unwanted consequences or negative side-effects but essential conditions and positive elements of liberal freedom. In this sense, liberalism nurtures danger, it subjects danger to an economic calculus, weighing its advantages against its costs. Liberal government must never fix security, since the striving for security and the danger of insecurity are complementary aspects of liberal governmentality: "[E]verywhere you see this stimulation of the fear of danger which is, as it were, the condition, the internal

psychological and cultural correlative of liberalism. There is no liberalism without a culture of danger" (2008: 66–67). This cultivation and stimulation of danger points to the moral dimension of liberal government. Individuals are expected to cope with social risks and insecurities, to measure and calculate them, taking precautions for themselves and their families. In this perspective it is entrepreneurial action, rational risk management, and individual responsibility that account for social success or failure (see Ewald 1996: 51–57).

In the course of the lectures Foucault also distinguishes analytically between legal regulations, disciplinary mechanisms, and technologies of security. The legal normativity operates by laws that codify norms, while discipline installs hierarchical differentiations that establish a division between those considered normal and the abnormal, the suitable and capable and the others. It functions by designing an optimal model and its operationalization, that is, by employing techniques and procedures to adjust and adapt individuals to this standard. The apparatuses of security represent the very opposite of the disciplinary system. While the latter assumes a prescriptive norm, the apparatuses of security take the empirically normal as a starting point that functions as a regulative norm allowing for differentiations and variations. Rather than adjusting reality to a predefined should-be value, the apparatuses of security take reality as the norm: as a statistical distribution of events, as the average rate of diseases, births and deaths, etc. The apparatuses of security do not draw an absolute borderline between the permitted and the prohibited, but specify an optimal middle within a spectrum of variations (2007: 55–63).

This distinction between different power technologies is also of historical and political significance. At the beginning of the 1970s Foucault had diagnosed an increasing disciplinarization of society, but he takes a different stance in the lectures on governmentality. He now states that in the "general economy of power" dominance has been displaced to security mechanisms. From this perspective, we are now living not in a legal state or in a disciplinary society but rather in a "security society" in which legal and disciplinary procedures and technologies have been increasingly colonized by apparatuses of security (2007: 11).[4]

This diagnosis was partially inspired by the political events of that time. Foucault's lectures of 1978 and 1979 took place at the climax of left-wing violence in Europe. The reactions of the different national states to so-called terrorism, the suspension of civil rights and the establishment of a control and supervision apparatus, could be seen as an involuntary confirmation of his thesis of the political dominance of security mechanisms. Foucault observed a relative devaluation of legal forms and the creeping development of an authoritarian security regime that operated against and beyond legal regulations and codes. In this historical context, the aim of political government was—according to Foucault—to stage a "fear game" (1994a: 367), to make clear that the legal arsenal was not sufficient to protect the population efficiently against existential dangers. He noted that the basis of security policy is not a social contract but rather a "security pact" (1994b: 390) between state and population that explicitly transgresses the legally defined limits of state intervention.

Foucault declared that the "fear of fear ... is one of the preconditions of the working of a security state" (ibid.). He stressed that the "misuses" of laws or the "infringement" of rights by the state are neither exceptional cases nor could they be reduced to the divergence between ideal and reality; they are, on the contrary, the foundation and guarantee of the "normal" existence of a legal state. From this perspective legal uncertainties and threats generate a permanent level of fear. The "state of fear" ("*État de peur*") is thus, according to Foucault, the other side of the legal state (1994e: 139–140).

The Government of Fear

Foucault's account of the intimate relationship between liberal government, the rule of law, and the production of fear is now thirty years old, but it still seems to be useful as a way of analyzing contemporary political and social transformations. On the one hand, the proliferation and implementation of neo-liberal forms of government has contributed to existential insecurities and the cultivation of fear in ways that go well beyond the level Foucault observed during his lifetime. On the other hand, the relevance of the Foucauldian analysis is demonstrated by political reactions to

terrorist attacks since 9/11. This includes the suspension of basic rights in the name of a general guarantee of security, and also the reduction of politics to police measures and military actions.

The concept of technologies of security presents a fruitful analytical tool for social theory and empirical investigations for several reasons. First, Foucault takes a critical distance from the tradition of political theory starting from Thomas Hobbes, which claimed that security is the precondition or basis for freedom. This external and dualistic conception of freedom and security, which is characteristic of the juridical discourse, is problematized by Foucault. For Foucault, security is a non-juridical concept that cannot be reduced to an authoritarian state or the rule of law but refers to social relations. It relies on statistical facts, risk calculations, and social routines. The "game of liberalism ... basically and fundamentally means acting so that reality develops, goes its way, and follows its own course according to the laws, principles, and mechanisms of reality itself" (2007: 48). There is no normative conflict between security and freedom; rather, freedom is something that can be calculated and arranged. Foucault conceives of security and freedom not as opposing principles but as constitutive parts of liberal governmentality; they are both elements of a single technology of government (Demirović 2008).

As a consequence, Foucault makes clear that the relationship between liberal freedom and mechanisms of security is more complex than a simple relation of complementarity, compensation, or correction. Transience, instability, and uncertainty are elementary ingredients of liberal government, in which freedom and fear refer to one another. The vision of an enterprising self promises manifold options and opportunities to consume, but it also necessitates the permanent calculation and estimation of risks, thus establishing a permanent fear of failure (Bröckling 2007). As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note, contemporary societies produce "forms of desire and pleasure that are intimately wedded to fear" (2000: 323, 339). Fear fulfils an important moral function in neo-liberal government. The constant threat of unemployment and poverty, and anxiety about the future, induce foresight and prudence. Fear not only stimulates a consciousness of economic risks and uncertainties that accompany the socially expected entrepreneurship; it is also an important means in the medicalization and geneticization

of society (ten Have 2004; Conrad 2007). It transforms healthy individuals into asymptomatically ill people who are expected to take preventive measures and to go to regular medical checkups to supervise and control their bodily risks. Here, fear is instrumental to cultivate a sense of susceptibility and vulnerability (Petersen and Wilkinson 2008). In the context of neo-liberal government, fear is the basis and motive for the constitution of the responsible, reliable, and rational self.

This brings us to another aspect: fear also has an important segregatory function. It divides society into particular homogenous groups, into communities of social, ethnic, religious, or economic equals that are governed by the assumption of non-dangerousness (Legnaro 2000: 207). Here the difference between endangered and dangerous individuals comes into play—a line of demarcation that materializes spatially in gated communities and slums, but is also visible in neighborhood watch programs. It is important to analyze this dynamic circle of production, regulation, and exploitation of fear. The government of populations and individuals operates by "technologies of fear" (Massumi 1993) that present society as an "exposed community," thus promoting an individual retreat to privacy. Coping with fear becomes a problem of individual psychology or a medical issue, while the material conditions and the strategic aims of the production of fear remain invisible (Davis 1998; Holert 2001).

It is also necessary to investigate the contradictory norms that characterize the neo-liberal government of insecurity. While individuals are addressed as prudent and cautious subjects that choose a responsible and rational, which means risk-minimizing, lifestyle, they are simultaneously incited to entrepreneurial action as risk-taking is transformed into a public virtue. Pat O'Malley has diagnosed the hybrid of an "enterprising prudentialism":

> The prudent subject of neo-liberalism should practice and sustain their autonomy by assembling information, material and practices together into a personalized strategy that identifies and minimizes their exposure to harm. Such risk management is frequently, and perhaps increasingly, associated with access to statistical or actuarial technologies and expert advice that render measurable the (probabilistic) calculation of future harms.... Enterprising subjects are imagined as innovators, who "reinvent" themselves and their environment. Here they appear

as *entrepreneurs,* not as prudent *consumers* of risk.... For the subject as entrepreneur, the future that must be governed must also remain uncertain, as a condition of a specific but vital form of liberal freedom. (2000: 465, emphasis in original)

There is a second reason to take up the notion of technologies of security for analytical and critical purposes. Technologies of security cannot be reduced to instruments and forms of regulation of a "security state" that employs top-down mechanisms of control and supervision. They cut across the difference between state and society or the distinction between private and public. While it is true that security is produced increasingly by private actors and less and less by state agencies, it would be misleading to simply oppose mechanisms of state security on the one hand to mechanisms of civil society and capitalist economy on the other. What we observe is a pluralization and commodification of mechanisms of security that are more and more dissociated from the state monopoly of violence—without limiting or reducing centralized technologies of supervision and control (Legnaro 2000; Wacquant 2008; see also Weldes et al. 1999). Quite on the contrary: collective systems of security and state-led mechanisms of control are gaining more significance, to the extent that individuals no longer live according to continuous biographies of work or have to work in precarious labor conditions, as they are expected to act in an entrepreneurial mode. The "privatization" of the production of security does not lead in any way to a demise of regulatory and steering competences of the state; rather, it has to be regarded as a reorganization or a restructuring of governmental technologies.

Furthermore, a reversal of the traditional relation between state and citizen is to be noted. Especially since 9/11, basic rights are no longer conceived as protective rights against the state, but allow the state to intervene in realms that were formerly regarded as private spheres by referring to security as a "super right." Governments in many countries have established new surveillance and database technologies that sometimes even operate outside the established legal frameworks and juridical processes. For example, the U.S. government has collected the domestic telephone and e-mail records of millions of businesses and households, thereby

violating legal rights and federal laws. This precautionary risk management or "hyperprevention" (Frankenberg 2006: 61) by state authorities has also created spaces that are exempt from ordinary legal procedures. It has resulted in the use of torture as a means in the so-called war on terror, and in indefinite detention of inmates in prisons around the world. In Guantánamo alone, nearly 300 prisoners have never been charged with any crime and lack the right to challenge their imprisonment (Nadesan 2008: 202–203; Chappell 2006).

The enlargement of the state's security apparatuses beyond or outside legal regulations and international law is complemented by another tendency, which it seems to contradict: the market principle is extended to the monopoly of violence, leading to the emergence of private security agencies and service providers. This tendency results in a new combination of class and risk society in which security has a price tag. The guarantee of security is no longer principally valid and equally available for everyone, but is subject to an economic calculus. Private enterprises offer security as a service, and the diagnosis and minimizing of socially produced risks is itself a profitable business (Legnaro 1997; Singer 2007; Monahan forthcoming).

However, the security industry cannot be reduced to activities to eliminate or minimize "unwanted" insecurities. It not only includes private security contractors, the armaments industry, insurance companies, and developers of antivirus software, but also comprises agencies and providers that focus on those forms of desire that "dangerous" experiences of the self or "risky" leisure time activities provide. Beyond the aesthetic experience of controlled insecurity, there is also an interest in the calculation of risk that is enjoyed as freedom in adventure holidays, rock climbing, drug experiences, etc. As Tom Holert notes, the consequences and the preconditions of such experiments with insecurity provide employment for medical doctors, psychologists, car repair workshops, and agencies specializing in the freeing of hostages (Holert 2004; Heinzelmann and Weinhart 2003).

Finally, the notion of technologies of security is useful as a way of detecting historical transformations and displacements in the way security is conceptualized and arranged.[5] There is a movement away from a defensive averting of danger or a retroactive

compensation of social risks to the prevention of dangers and the active management of incidence rates of (unwanted) events. In more and more social fields, we witness abstract and general diagnoses of risk that are disconnected from concrete and temporal limited dangers. These "pre-emptive strategies" evoke a permanent state of exception; they are not a provisional and limited institution, but constitute a boundless and permanent social charge (Cooper 2006; Dillon 2007).

Inside this political transformation, two strategies exist in parallel. They seem to exclude each other, but in fact they complement one another. On the one hand, control is displaced from concrete persons to the supervision of spaces and abstract structures of opportunity. At the center of this strategy we find not individuals or groups, but rather situational contexts and possible conducts. The control technologies no longer operate with moral categories like blame or responsibility, but rather aim at an economic-rational management of currents of mobility and information by regulating operational functions and admission schemes (Castel 1991; Krasmann 2003).

On the other hand, it is also possible to detect a re-moralization of political and social discourses giving rise to new forms of individual and collective responsibility concerning "dangerous" or "risky" forms of behavior. Also, re-moralization plays a role in justifying political, military, or social interventions distinguishing between good and bad or friends and enemies. We may think of George Bush's religiously loaded rhetoric, which evoked a struggle between good and evil (Hochschild 2003).

The Risks of Security

These points offer some perspectives for ways in which one could take up Foucault's concept of "technologies of security." I have indicated how this analytical instrument could be used to critically investigate the triad of freedom, fear, and security that characterizes neo-liberal government. But what idea of autonomy informs Foucault's account, and how exactly does he conceive of the relation between security and autonomy?

In an interview published in 1983, Foucault presents his ideas about the problems and perspectives of the social security system.

This text, which became known to an English-speaking audience under the title *The Risks of Security,* is characterized by a certain ambivalence. At first sight, Foucault seems to subscribe to the neo-liberal critique of the welfare state by identifying some "perverse effects" of the social security system, namely the "growing rigidity of certain mechanisms and the creation of situations of dependency" (2000h: 366). At the same time, he takes a critical stance toward the liberal opposition of state and civil society (ibid.: 371–372) and insists that he does not "advocate that savage liberalism that would lead to individual coverage for those who have the means to pay for it, and to a lack of coverage for the others" (ibid.: 379).

Foucault is obviously performing a double negation. He seeks to develop the idea of an autonomy that neither follows the rigidi-ties of an authoritarian regime of social security by pre-designing "normal" ways of life nor subscribes to the neo-liberal freedom of the market and consumer options. He envisions a system of social security that would "free us from dangers *and* from situations that tend to debase or to subjugate us" (ibid.: 366; emphasis added). He puts forward a different idea of security: "a security that opens the way to richer, more numerous, more diverse, and more flexible relationships with ourselves and others, all the while assuring each of us real autonomy" (ibid.).[6]

One of the lessons we can learn from Foucault's engagement with "technologies of security" is that it is not sufficient to expose the risks of the liberal idea of security that operates by producing social segregation and anxiety. It is necessary to imagine and invent a form of security that allows for difference and autonomy with-out creating fear. To pursue this objective will certainly be a risky enterprise, but hopefully one that will set limits to the dangerous imperative of preemption, prevention, and prediction that dreams of controlling the future by promising "happiness for a life to which nothing happens" (Castel 1991: 289).

In the next chapter, I shall attempt to link up these consider-ations on security with some general thoughts on critique. Indeed, Foucault's lectures on liberal and neo-liberal governmentality were not only contemporaneous with what might be called the first war on terrorism. In 1978, Foucault presented a paper to the French Society of Philosophy under the title *What is critique?* (1997g). This text signaled the beginning of an interest in the relationship

between Kant, Enlightenment, and critique that would last until his death. One important aspect of Foucault's account of critique is the idea that critique materializes in a "fearless speech" by an individual or a group willing to expose their own ontological status.